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Executive Summary 
 
  This paper has two objectives: first, to provide more information on the data used 
to construct a controversial economic analysis published by the Joint Center that makes 
use of over 100 government regulatory impact analyses; and second, to provide further 
sensitivity analysis of key variables in that study.  
 
A key finding of this paper is that the results of the earlier analysis of government 
regulatory impact analyses appear to be fairly robust within the data set that was 
constructed. We offer the following conclusions. First, aggregate net benefits for final 
regulations are positive under a wide variety of assumptions. Second, a substantial 
number of final regulations do not pass a benefit-cost test under a wide variety of 
assumptions. By rejecting at least some of these regulations, government could have 
increased aggregate net social benefits. Third, aggregate net benefits exhibit a wide range 
across regulations. And fourth, agencies should improve the quality of their regulatory 




Reviewing the Government’s Numbers on Regulation 
 





  The AEI-Brookings Joint Center has published a number of controversial pieces 
on regulation. One of the reasons for the controversy is that there is a great deal of 
disagreement over whether or not cost-benefit analysis should be applied to regulation.
1 
A second reason is that there is disagreement on how cost-benefit analysis should be 
applied to regulation. 
One of the most controversial pieces of economic analysis published by the Joint 
Center was a chapter by Hahn in his book entitled Reviving Regulatory Reform.
2 That 
chapter, which built on an earlier study, provided the most comprehensive assessment of 
government analyses of regulatory activity.
3  
The basic units of analysis for Hahn’s two studies were regulatory impact 
analyses (RIAs) provided by the government.
4 Each RIA is supposed to contain an 
assessment of the costs and benefits of a proposed or final regulation.
5  
                                                           
1  For a view that supports the use of cost-benefit analysis for federal regulations, see KENNETH ARROW ET 
AL., BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION: A STATEMENT OF 
PRINCIPLES  (1986),  available at http://aei.brookings.org/publications/books/benefit_cost_analysis.pdf. 
[hereinafter Benefit-Cost Principles]. For a critique of the use of cost-benefit analysis for regulations, see, 
e.g., Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental 
Protection, GEO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y INST.(2002) [hereinafter Pricing the Priceless].  
2 ROBERT W. HAHN, REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 63 (2000). [hereinafter 
Government Numbers II]. 
3 For Hahn’s earlier study, see Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government’s Numbers 
Tell Us?, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED, 237 (Robert W. Hahn, ed., 1996) [hereinafter Government 
Numbers I]. See Government Numbers II for a more recent study. We focus here on Government Numbers 
II because Government Numbers I is a subset of the final regulations used in Government Numbers II. In 
the more recent work, Hahn added seventy-six regulations to the original database, some from 1981 to 
1990 and some from 1995 to 1996.   
4 Where RIAs were not available, Federal Register notices were used. See infra §2, tbl. A-1 to find which 
regulations did not have RIAs. If a regulation in the table does not have an RIN number, but has an FR 
Cite, then the Federal Register notice was used instead of the RIA. For a definition of regulatory impact 
analysis, see OMB 2003 Report, Appendix D: OMB Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2003_cost-ben_final_rpt.pdf. “Regulatory Analysis is a tool 
regulatory agencies use to anticipate and evaluate the likely consequences of their actions. It provides a 
formal way of organizing the evidence on the key effects—good and bad—of the various alternatives that 
should be considered in developing regulations. The motivation is to (1) learn if the benefits of an action 
are likely to justify the costs or (2) discover which of various possible alternatives would be most cost-
effective. By choosing actions that maximize net benefits, agencies direct resources to their most efficient 
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  This paper has two objectives: first, to provide more information on the database 
used to construct the analysis in Hahn’s chapter; and second, to provide further sensitivity 
analyses of key variables in that study. A key finding of this paper is that the results of 
the earlier study appear to be fairly robust within the data set that was constructed.   
Section 2 of the paper discusses some basic information on the database. Section 3 
provides sensitivity analyses and discusses the sensitivity analysis issue. Section 4 
concludes.  We present detailed information on the database in the appendix.  
 
 
2. Information on the Database 
 
  This section provides information on the database.
6 We focus here on final 
regulations because these regulations have actually been implemented.  
Table A-1 summarizes information on 106 final regulations promulgated between 
1983 and 1996. We include a brief description of the regulation, its identifier number, the 
regulatory agency, and information from the related Federal Register notice.
7   
       
 
3. Sensitivity Analyses 
    
        Sensitivity analyses can help illustrate how aggregate net benefits and the 
percentage of final regulations that pass a benefit-cost test vary with changes in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
use.”  See also Hahn, Government Numbers II, en. 4, at 84 for a definition of regulatory impact analyses 
and major regulations. (“Agencies have produced RIAs for every regulation since Reagan’s Executive 
Order 12291, issued in 1981. An RIA includes the agency’s estimates of the benefits and costs of the 
regulation in addition to other information designed in the executive order. Reagan’s order required 
agencies to produce an RIA for each proposed and final “major” rule, defined generally as a rule with an 
estimated annual impact on the economy of $100 million or more. President Clinton’s Executive Order 
12866, issued in 1993, changed the term regulatory impact analysis to economic analysis and the term 
major to economically significant but otherwise did not significantly change the RIA requirement. I use 
regulatory impact analysis throughout this chapter because analysts use the term more frequently than 
economic analysis.”). 
5 A proposed regulation is simply a proposal for adopting a regulation. A final regulation is the actual 
regulation.  
6 We have not authorized the publication of any data related to this project by third parties. The table 
referenced in this section can be found in the appendix to this paper.  
7 Some older regulations do not have identifier numbers or accessible Federal Register notices. A blank 
indicates that such information was not available.  
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assumptions and data.
8  We provide and describe sensitivity analyses on several variables 
below.
9  
  Tables 1 through 4 illustrate the impact of varying the value of a statistical life 
(VSL) and the real discount rate on the aggregate net benefits of final regulations, based 
on the government’s numbers in the agencies’ regulatory impact analyses (RIAs).
10 The 
VSL in each of these tables varies from $1 million to $9 million.
11 The discount rate 
varies from 1 percent to 9 percent. The number in each cell of a table indicates the 
aggregate net benefits of final regulations in billions of dollars, corresponding to a 
specific VSL and discount rate.   
Table 1 shows that the aggregate net benefits of final regulations are positive 
under all assumptions for the VSL and the discount rate. The aggregate net benefits are 
                                                           
8 OMB in its 2003 Draft Report also advocates the use of sensitivity analyses. See OMB 2003 Draft Report, 
at 5523 (recommending that agencies “use a numerical sensitivity analysis to examine how the results of 
your analysis vary with plausible changes in assumptions, choices of input data, and alternative analytical 
approaches. Sensitivity analysis is especially valuable when the information is lacking to carry out a formal 
probabilistic simulation. Sensitivity analysis can be used to find “switch points”—critical parameter values 
at which estimated net benefits change sign or the low cost alternative switches. Sensitivity analysis usually 
proceeds by changing one variable or assumption at a time, but it can also be done by varying a 
combination of variables simultaneously to learn more about the robustness of your results to widespread 
changes. Again, however, major regulations above the $1 billion threshold require a formal treatment.”) 
9 See infra, tbl. 1 through tbl. 9 for the sensitivity analyses. The VSL in each table is reported in millions of 
1994 dollars. When we did the net benefit calculations, we converted the VSL to 1995 dollars. The real 
discount rate for the base case is 5 percent. We also examine the 1 percent, 3 percent, 7 percent, and 9 
percent scenarios in the sensitivity analyses. Aggregate net benefits are rounded to two significant digits. In 
addition to conducting the sensitivity analyses that we present in this paper, we also conducted sensitivity 
analyses with varying pollution values. In cases where we varied the pollution values, we used low 
pollution values for VSLs of $1M and $3M, base pollution values for a VSL of $5M, and high pollution 
values for VSLs of $7M and $9M. Varying pollution values from the base case slightly affects the overall 
results and conclusions: first, in table 1, aggregate net benefits are positive over the entire range of VSLs 
and discount rates when pollution values are constant. Under varying pollution values, when VSL is $1M 
and discount rates are 7 percent and 9 percent, aggregate net benefits change from large positive numbers 
to small negative numbers; second, table 7 reveals that when we hold pollution values constant and add 
non-standardized benefits, less than half of the regulations would pass a benefit-cost test under all 
assumptions for VSL and discount rate. Under varying pollution values, approximately half would pass 
when VSL is $9M and discount rates are 1 percent and 3 percent; and third, table 8 shows that when non-
standard monetized benefits are included, regulations with zero benefits are excluded, and pollution values 
are constant, more than half the regulations would pass under all assumptions for discount rate and VSL. 
Under varying pollution values, less than half would pass when VSL is $1M and $3M.   
10 See Hahn, Government Numbers II, at 38 (“I used the government’s numbers provided in the regulatory 
impact analyses to aggregate the benefits and costs of regulations from 1981 to mid-1996, to determine 
which regulations pass a benefit-cost test, and to identify factors that explain variation in the estimates of 
regulatory cost-effectiveness.”) 
11 Value of statistical life values are in millions of 1994 dollars. We updated these values to 1995 dollars 
when we calculated the aggregate net benefits.    
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small when the discount rate is high and the VSL is low. Similarly, the aggregate net 
benefits are large when the discount rate is low and the VSL is high. 
                                                                
       
 
     Table 1 
 
The Impact of Varying the Value of Statistical Life and the Discount Rate 
on the Aggregate Net Benefits of Final Regulations 
 
     (n=106) 
        
 
    
Discount    
Rate    
 1% 3% 5% 7% 9% 
              $1m   540 410 330 270 220 
      $3m   1500 1200 1100  920  830 
VSL      $5m  2500 2100 1800 1600 1400 
      $7m   3400 2900 2500 2200 2000 
      $9m   4400 3700 3200 2900 2700 
       
 
    Notes: Net benefits are in billions of 1995 dollars. VSL is in millions of 1994 dollars. 
 
 
Table 2 shows that aggregate net benefits of final regulations are positive under 
all assumptions for VSL and discount rate when regulations with zero benefits are 
excluded from the aggregate net benefits calculation. The exclusion of regulations with 
zero benefits removes many regulations with negative net benefits, a result that tends to 
increase aggregate net benefits.




                                                           
12 However, some regulations with zero benefits have positive net benefits because these regulations have 
cost savings that exceed gross costs.  
  
  




The Impact of Excluding Final Regulations with Zero Benefits  
on the Aggregate Net Benefits 
 
       (n= 74) 
        
 
    
Discount    
Rate                                             
  1% 3% 5% 7% 9% 
$1m  700 560 470 400 350 
$3m  1700 1400 1200 1100 1000 
 VSL   $5m  2600 2200 1900 1700 1600 
$7m  3600 3000 2600 2400 2200 
$9m  4600 3800 3400 3000 2800 
       
 




Table 3 considers the impact of including non-standard monetized benefits. Non-
standard monetized benefits were benefits that the agency monetized but did not fit our 
standard categories of benefits.
13 The table shows that the inclusion of non-standard 
monetized benefits does not significantly affect the aggregate net benefits of final 
regulations under different scenarios for the discount rate and the VSL.  The aggregate 
net benefits are positive over the entire range.    
                                                           
13 Non-standard monetized benefits included such things as reducing ozone’s effect on non-vegetation and 
reduced medical expense.  
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    Table 3 
 
The Impact of Adding Non-Standard Benefits 
                             on the Aggregate Net Benefits of Final Regulations 
 
    (n=106) 
        
 
    
Discount   
Rate                                             
 1% 3% 5% 7% 9% 
$1m  620 490 400 330 280 
$3m  1600 1300 1100  990  890 
VSL    $5m  2600 2100 1800 1600 1500 
$7m  3500 2900 2600 2300 2100 
$9m  4500 3800 3300 3000 2700 
       
 




Table 4 shows that with the inclusion of non-standard monetized benefits and the 
exclusion of zero benefit regulations, the aggregate net benefits of final regulations 
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     Table 4 
 
       The Impact of Adding Non-Standard Benefits on the Aggregate Net Benefits 
                    of Final Regulations (Excluding Regulations with Zero Benefits) 
 
      (n=76) 
        
 
    
Discount   
Rate    
 1% 3% 5% 7% 9% 
$1m  750 610 510 440 390 
$3m  1700 1400 1200 1100 1000 
VSL    $5m  2700 2200 2000 1800 1600 
$7m  3600 3100 2700 2400 2200 
$9m  4600 3900 3400 3100 2800 
       
 
    Notes: Net benefits are in billions of 1995 dollars. VSL is in millions of 1994 dollars. 
 
 
Tables 5 through 8 illustrate the impact of varying the VSL and the discount rate 
on the percentage of final regulations that would pass a benefit-cost test, based on 
quantifiable benefits and costs. As in tables 1 through 4, the VSL varies from $1 million 
to $9 million and the discount rate varies from 1 percent to 9 percent. The number in each 
cell indicates the percentage of final regulations that would pass a benefit-cost test, 
corresponding to a specific VSL and discount rate.   
Table 5 reveals that in the base case where VSL is $5 million and the discount 
rate is 5 percent, 43 percent of the 106 regulations pass a benefit-cost test. Moreover, the 
percentage of regulations that pass such a test varies from 35 percent when the VSL is 
very low and the discount rate is very high to 45 percent when the VSL is very high and 
the discount rate is very low. Less than half of the final regulations pass a benefit-cost 
test under even the most favorable circumstances for passing a benefit-cost test.   
  
  




The Impact of Varying the Value of Statistical Life and the Discount Rate  
on Regulations Passing a Benefit-Cost Test 
 
      (n=106)
14 
        
 
    
Discount   
Rate    
 1% 3% 5% 7% 9% 
$1m  38% 38% 37% 36% 35% 
$3m  41% 41% 41% 40% 40% 
VSL    $5m  43% 43% 43% 42% 42% 
$7m  43% 43% 43% 42% 42% 
$9m  45% 45% 43% 42% 42% 
       
 






Table 6 shows that when final regulations with zero benefits are excluded, 59 
percent of the remaining 74 regulations pass a benefit-cost test in the base case. The 
percentage of regulations that pass such a test varies from 47 percent when the VSL is 
very low and the discount rate is very high to 62 percent when the VSL is very high and 
the discount rate is very low. A significant number of regulations would fail a benefit-
cost test under all assumptions even when regulations with zero benefits are excluded.  
                                                           
14 See Robert W. Hahn, In Defense of the Economic Analysis of Regulation, AEI-Brookings Joint Center 
(forthcoming, 2004), tbl. 4. [hereinafter Defense of Economic Analysis]. 
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     Table 6 
 
                   The Impact of Excluding Regulations with Zero Benefits  
                              on Regulations Passing a Benefit-Cost Test 
 




     
    
Discount   
Rate    
 1% 3% 5% 7% 9% 
$1m  51% 51% 50% 49% 47% 
$3m  55% 55% 55% 54% 54% 
VSL    $5m  59% 59% 59% 58% 58% 
$7m  59% 59% 59% 58% 58% 
$9m  62% 62% 59% 58% 58% 
       
 
    Notes: VSL is in millions of 1994 dollars. 
 
Table 7 shows that when non-standard monetized benefits are included in the full 
sample, 45 percent of the 106 regulations pass a benefit-cost test in the base case. The 
percentage of regulations that pass a benefit-cost test varies from 38 percent when the 
VSL is very low and the discount rate is very high to 47 percent when the VSL is very 
high and the discount rate is very low. In all cases, less than half of the regulations would 
pass a benefit-cost test.
16 The inclusion of non-standard monetized benefits for the full 
sample of 106 final regulations does not significantly affect the results or conclusions.  
                                                           
15 See Defense of Economic Analysis, tbl. 5.  
16 See Defense of Economic Analysis, tbl. 6 for the incremental impact of adding non-standard benefits on 
regulations passing a benefit-cost test. This table shows that when non-standard benefits are included, only 
two regulations that did not pass a benefit-cost test now pass a benefit-cost test in almost all the cases 
considered. The only exception occurs in the unlikely scenario that an additional three regulations would 
pass – where the VSL is $1 million and the discount rate is 9 percent.  
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      Table 7 
 
The Impact of Adding Non-Standard Benefits  
on Regulations Passing a Benefit-Cost Test 
 
      (n=106) 
        
 
    
Discount   
Rate    
 1% 3% 5% 7% 9% 
$1m  40% 40% 39% 38% 38% 
$3m  42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 
 
VSL    $5m  45% 45% 45% 44% 44% 
$7m  45% 45% 45% 44% 44% 
$9m  47% 47% 45% 44% 44% 
       
 
    Notes: VSL is in millions of 1994 dollars. 
 
Table 8 shows that when non-standard monetized benefits are included and 
regulations with zero benefits are excluded, 61 percent of the 72 remaining regulations 
pass a benefit-cost test in the base case. The percentage of regulations that pass a benefit-
cost test varies from 50 percent when the VSL is very low and the discount rate is very 
high to 63 percent when the VSL is very high and the discount rate is very low. A 
significant number of regulations would fail a benefit-cost test under all assumptions 
even when regulations with zero benefits are excluded and non-standard monetized 
benefits are included.  
This result suggests that in the restricted sample, the inclusion of non-standard 
monetized benefits has close to a negligible impact on the percentage of regulations that 
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    Table 8 
 
The Impact of Adding Non-Standard Benefits on Regulations Passing a  
Benefit- Cost Test (Excluding Regulations with Zero Benefits) 
 




    
Discount   
Rate    
 1% 3% 5% 7% 9% 
$1m  53% 53% 51% 50% 50% 
$3m  57% 57% 57% 55% 55% 
    
VSL    $5m  61% 61% 61% 59% 59% 
$7m  61% 61% 61% 59% 59% 
$9m  63% 63% 61% 59% 59% 
       
 
    Notes: VSL is in millions of 1994 dollars. 
 
Table 9 includes only those regulations that failed a benefit-cost test. This table 
illustrates the impact of varying the value of a statistical life (VSL) and the discount rate 
on the aggregate net benefits of final regulations that fail.   
Table 9 shows that the aggregate net benefits of final regulations that fail a 
benefit-cost test range from a low of -$340 billion when the VSL is $1 million and the 
discount rate is 1 percent to a high of -$270 billion when the VSL is $9 million and the 
discount rate is 7 percent or 9 percent.
17 The absolute value of aggregate net benefits for 
regulations that fail a benefit-cost test is substantial under all assumptions, which 
                                                           
17 We also conducted sensitivity analyses for the cases where we excluded zero benefit regulations and 
added non-standard benefits. In these cases, aggregate net benefits of final regulations that failed a benefit-
cost test remained significantly negative.  
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suggests that net benefits could increase substantially if the government did not 
implement at least some of these regulations.
18        
   
     Table 9 
 
The Impact of Varying the Value of Statistical Life and the Discount Rate on the 
Aggregate Net Benefits of Regulations that Fail a Benefit-Cost Test 
 
 
    
Discount   
Rate    
 1% 3% 5% 7% 9% 
$1m  -340 -310 -300 -290 -290 
$3m  -320 -300 -290 -280 -280 
VSL    $5m  -310 -290 -280 -280 -270 
$7m  -310 -290 -280 -270 -270 
$9m  -300 -290 -280 -270 -270 
       
 
Notes: Net benefits are in billions of 1995 dollars. VSL is in millions of 1994 dollars. The number of     
regulations that fail a benefit-cost test varies between 58 and 69, depending on the VSL and discount 
rate.   
 
Table 10 reveals the impact of varying benefits and costs on three benefit-cost 
measures. The discount rate is set at 5 percent and the VSL is $5 million. The first row of 
the table shows that aggregate net benefits remain positive and substantial under almost 
all variations of benefits and costs. The second row of the table illustrates that in most 
cases, the percentage of final regulations that pass a benefit-cost test is below fifty 
percent. The third row of the table reveals that the absolute value of aggregate net 
benefits that fail a benefit-cost test is substantial for almost all ranges of benefits and 
costs. This result suggests that government can substantially increase the aggregate net 
                                                           
18 This assumes that unquantified benefits are of second order importance to such regulations. It would 
have been possible to explore this issue in greater depth in making choices for particular cases.  
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benefits of regulations if it rejects regulations that fail a benefit-cost test or replaces them 
with alternatives that pass a benefit-cost test.
19    
 
    Table 10 
 
                                  The Impact of Varying Benefits and Costs
20 




















































    
   Results 
 
Percentage 







































Notes: Net Benefits are in billions of 1995 dollars. Aggregate Net Benefits are rounded to two significant 
digits. Very Low Benefits means that benefits are 50% of the base case; Low Benefits means that benefits 
are 75% of the base case; High Benefits means that benefits are 125% of the base case; Very High Benefits 
means that benefits are 150% of the base case.  The same measures also apply to costs.  
                                                           
19 See Robert W. Hahn, Randall W. Lutter, & W. Kip Viscusi, Do Federal Regulations Reduce Mortality?, 
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies (2000), at 1 (“Specifically, we believe that an 
assessment of the mortality implications of regulatory costs can and should be used to help identify those 
regulations whose primary purpose is to save lives but that may have the unintended consequence of 
actually increasing mortality. In such perverse cases, Congress and the regulatory agencies should seriously 
consider alternatives that would yield higher levels of economic welfare and save more lives.”) See also 
John F. Morrall III, Saving Lives: A Review of the Record (July 2003), at 1 (“Wide differences in cost-
effectiveness indicate we could save more lives more effectively…I suggest several potential regulations 
that could save lives more cost-effectively than the vast majority of regulations to date.”) 
20 See Defense of Economic Analysis, tbl. 1. 
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Finally, we compared the impact of assuming that there is no latency period to the 
base case, which assumes a latency period for leukemia, lung cancer, and heart and 
stroke. The latency period measures the time between exposure and the onset of a disease 
or illness. The table illustrates that assuming there is no latency period marginally affects 




   Table 11 
   
  The Impact of Latency 
 
   (n=106) 
 
 No  Latency  Base  Case 
Aggregate Net Benefits ($B)  1900 1800 
Percentage of Regulations that Pass a Benefit-Cost Test  43% 43% 
Aggregate Net Benefits of Regulations that Fail a B/C Test ($B)  -270 -280 
 
Notes: Aggregate net benefits are in billions of 1995 dollars and rounded to two significant digits. 
                                                           
21 This result may seem counter-intuitive because one may expect latency periods to have a greater effect 
on the percentage of regulations that pass a benefit-cost test. Instead, our result shows that the number of 
regulations that pass a benefit-cost test remains unchanged. There are three explanations for this result. 
First, less than a third of final regulations are affected by changes in latency periods. Second, the 
regulations most affected by latency period adjustments either pass or fail by significant margins. These 
regulations do not change sign when there is no latency period. Third, a majority of the 31 regulations 
affected by latency period adjustments save fewer than 6 lives annually.    
  
  





  This paper has provided a reassessment of the government numbers database. 
Information has been provided on the basic data. In addition, we provided several 
additional sensitivity analyses. 
There were three basic conclusions from the main study. First, the aggregate 
estimates of agency net benefits based on the government’s own numbers are positive.  
Second, the government can increase the net benefits of regulation. Less than half the 
regulations pass a neutral economist’s benefit-cost test. The net benefits would increase 
substantially if agencies rejected such regulations. Third, the net benefits exhibit a wide 
range, which suggests that a reallocation of regulatory resources could increase the 
aggregate net benefits of regulation. There were several other findings, but the preceding 
findings were highlighted in the latest study.
22 
Based on the sensitivity analyses in this paper, we have modified the second 
conclusion, highlighted in italics:     
The government can increase the net benefits of regulation. A significant fraction 
of regulations would pass a benefit-cost test based on quantifiable benefits and costs and 
a significant fraction of regulations would fail. Our best estimate is that about half of the 
regulations would pass such a test and half the regulations would fail.
23  
                                                           
22 One such finding is that the quality of regulatory analysis varies considerably. See discussion in Hahn, 
Government Numbers II, at 35: “An agency’s decision to quantify the benefits or cost savings of a 
regulation appears to depend on the specific agency and the type of regulation.”  See also Hahn, 
Government Numbers II, at 34, for a discussion of the lack of quantification by some agencies. (“Perhaps 
most important, in many cases a particular agency did not complete its quantitative analysis of benefits or 
cost savings. Since the lack of quantification makes it difficult to hold agencies accountable for their 
decisions, I closely examine the quantification issue. I consider the Environmental Protection Agency 
particularly carefully because other scholars have note that the EPA tends to quantify benefits and costs 
less rigorously than other agencies.”)  See also Robert W. Hahn, et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact 
Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23(3) HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 859 (2000)  (presenting figures comparing agency analyses of monetized costs, monetized benefits, 
monetized net benefits, cost-effectiveness, and alternatives.)    
23 This result applies to final regulations. This analysis is consistent with an analysis done by Hahn, Lutter 
and Viscusi who find that about 58% of regulations aimed specifically at savings lives would not pass a 
benefit-cost test. See Robert Hahn, Randall Lutter, & W. Kip Viscusi, Do Federal Regulations Reduce 
Mortality?, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, at 15 (“Those regulations are the most 
logical candidates for our analysis because their primary effect is to reduce mortality risk.”) See also John 
F. Morrall III, Saving Lives: A Review of the Record (July 2003). The sensitivity analysis in this paper 
reveals that the range is fairly wide. But even in the more optimistic scenarios, a significant fraction of 
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The bottom line is that one of the main conclusions was modified with additional 





                                                                                                                                                                             
regulations would fail such a benefit-cost test. A reasonable lower bound on the number of regulations that 
would fail a benefit-cost using the analysis presented here is something on the order of 35 to 40 percent. 
See supra, tbl. 8 for the most favorable circumstance in which non-standard benefits are included, 
regulations with zero benefits are excluded, VSL is 9 million dollars, and discount rate is 1 percent. Even in 
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Appendix 1: Information on the Final Regulations 
 
  Table A-1 
 
Summary Information for Final Regulations Used in Net Benefit Calculations 
                                                           
    (n=106) 
 
 
Regulation  RIN  Agency FR Cite  FR Date 
Childproof lighters    CPSC 58FR131 7/12/1993 
Safety standards for explosives at metal and 
nonmetal mines  1219-AA17 DOL  58FR69596  12/30/1993
Safety standards for ventilation in underground coal 
mines  1219-AA11 DOL 57FR20868  5/15/1992 
Occupational exposure to asbestos  1218-AB25 DOL  59FR40964  8/10/1994 
Lead exposure in construction (interim final rule)    DOL 58FR26590 5/4/1993 
Occupational exposure to cadmium (two separate 
standards, one for general industry and one for the 
construction industry)  1218-AB16 DOL  57FR42102  9/14/1992 
Occupational exposure to 4,4' methylenedianiline    DOL 57FR35630  9/10/1992 
Bloodborne pathogens    DOL 56FR235  12/6/1991 
Hazardous waste operations and emergency 
response 1218-AB13 DOL  54FR9294  3/6/1989 
Occupational exposure to formaldehyde  1218-AA82 DOL  52FR46168  12/4/1987 
Standard for occupational exposure to benzene  1218-AA47 DOL  52FR34460  9/11/1987 
Occupational exposure to asbestos  1218-AA26 DOL  51FR22612  6/20/1986 
Permit required confined spaces  1218-AA51 DOL  58FR4462  1/14/1993 
Process safety management of highly hazardous 
chemicals  1218-AB20 DOL 57FR36  2/24/1992 
Electrical safety-related work practices  1218-AA32 DOL  55FR31984  8/6/1990 
Control of hazardous energy (lockout/tagout)  1218-AA53 DOL  54FR36634  9/1/1989 
Underground construction  1218-AA38 DOL  54FR23824  6/2/1989 
Concrete and masonry construction (full 
compliance with the revised standard)  1218-AA20 DOL  53FR22612  6/16/1988 
Mechanical power press standard     DOL 53FR8322  3/14/1988 
Grain handling facilities  1218-AA22 DOL  52FR49592  12/31/1987
Commuter operations and general certification and 
operations requirements  2120-AF62 DOT  60FR65831  12/20/1995
Stability and control while braking requirements for 
medium and heavy vehicles     DOT  58FR50738  9/28/1993 
Head impact protection     DOT    
Center high mount stop lamp on vehicles other than 
passenger cars    DOT  56FR16015  4/15/1991 
Extension of automatic crash requirements to light 
trucks (assuming automatic belt usage at 60%, 
motorized)     DOT 56FR12472  3/21/1991 
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Side impact protection  - this also includes 
reporting compliance, anthropomorphic test 
dummy, and moving deformable barrier    DOT 55FR45722  10/30/1990
Federal motor vehicle standard, occupant crash 
protection (assuming use of automatic belts vs. 
manual belts at 12.5% usage)     DOT 49FR28962  7/17/1984 
Vessel response plans  2115-AD81 DOT  61FR1051  1/12/1996 
Double hull standards for vessels carrying oil in 
bulk 2115-AD61 DOT  60FR13318  3/10/1995 
Municipal solid waste landfills: NSPS and EG  2060-AC42 EPA  61FR9905  3/12/1996 
Federal standards for marine vessel loading and 
unloading operations and NESHAP for marine tank 
vessel loading and unloading operations  2060-AD02 EPA  60FR48388  9/19/1995 
Municipal waste combustors: EG and NSPS  2060-AD00 EPA 
60FR65381 
60FR65387  12/19/1995
Ozone transport commission: low emission vehicle 
program for the northeast ozone transport region  2060-AF15 EPA 60FR4711  1/24/1995 
NESHAP: petroleum refining operations  2060-AD94 EPA    
Control of air pollution from new motor vehicles 
and new motor vehicle engines, refueling emission 
regulations for light-duty vehicles and trucks and 
heavy-duty vehicles (assuming stage II is not 
present)  2060-AC64 EPA 59FR16262 4/6/1994 
Fuel and fuel additives: standards for reformulated 
gasoline 2060-AD27 EPA  59FR7810  2/16/1994 
Hazardous waste, treatment, and disposal facilities: 
organic air emission standards for tanks, surface 
impoundments, and containers  2060-AB94 EPA  59FR62896  12/6/1994 
Acid rain NOx regulations under title IV of the 
CAAA of 1990  2060-AD45 EPA 59FR13538  3/22/1994 
Clean fuel fleet program requirements for vehicle 
conversions and the California pilot program  2060-AC10 EPA  59FR50042  9/30/1994 
Determination of significance for nonroad sources 
and emission standards for new nonroad 
compression ignition engines at or above 37 
kilowatts, control of air pollution   2060-AD54 EPA  59FR31306  6/17/1994 
Equivalent emissions limitations under CAA 
section 112(J)  2060-AE00 EPA  59FR26429  6/20/1994 
Fuels and fuel additives registration regulations   2060-AC10 EPA  59FR33042  6/27/1994 
Hazardous organic NESHAP (HON) for the 
synthetic organic chemical manufacturing industry 
(SOCMI) and other processes subject to the 
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Interim requirements for deposit control gasoline 
additives, regulations of fuels and fuel additives 
(expected program)  2060-AD71 EPA 59FR54678  11/1/1994 
Regulation of fuels and fuel additives: renewable 
oxygenate requirement for reformulated gasoline 
(incremental cost over RFG)  2060-AE69 EPA 59FR39258 8/2/1994 
Control of air pollution from new motor vehicles 
and new motor vehicle engines, regulations 
requiring on-board diagnostic systems on 1994 and 
later model year light-duty vehicles  2060-AC65 EPA  58FR9468  2/19/1993 
Criteria and procedures for determining conformity 
to state or federal implementation plans of 
transportation plans, programs, and projects funded 
or approved under title 2.  2060-AE60 EPA  58FR62188  11/24/1993
Determining conformity of general federal actions 
to state or federal implementation plans  2060-AE10 EPA  58FR63214  11/30/1993
Evaporative emission regulations for gasoline-
fueled and methanol-fueled light duty vehicles, 
light-duty trucks, and heavy-duty vehicles   2060-AC64 EPA  58FR16002  3/24/1993 
Acid rain permits, allowance system, emissions 
monitoring, excess emissions and appeals 





Operating permits regulations title V of the CAA  2060-AD16 EPA  57FR32250  7/21/1992 
Vehicle inspection and maintenance requirements 
for state implementation plan (final rule)  2060-AD89 EPA  57FR52950  11/5/1992 
Tier 1 light-duty tailpipe standards and useful life 





NESHAP: Benzene emissions from benzene 
transfer operations  2060-AC68 EPA  55FR8292  3/7/1990 
NESHAP: Benzene emissions from benzene waste 
operations  2060-AC68 EPA 55FR8292 3/7/1990 
Fuel quality for diesel fuel sold in 1993 and later  2060-AC00 EPA  54FR35276  8/21/1990 
Volatility regulations for gasoline and alcohol 
blends sold in calendar year 1992 and beyond - 
phase II  2060-AB89 EPA 55FR23658  6/11/1990 
Volatility regulations for gasoline and alcohol 
blends sold in calendar year 1992 and beyond - 
phase I  2060-AB89 EPA 54FR11868  3/22/1989 
NESHAP: proposed response to remand for 
benzene storage  2060-AC41 EPA  54FR38044  9/14/1989 
NESHAP: proposed response to remand for coke 
by-product recovery plants  2060-AC41 EPA 54FR38044  9/14/1989 
NSPS for new residential wood heaters  2060-AB68 EPA  53FR5860  2/26/1988 
NSPS: Industrial-commercial-institutional steam 
generating units (SO2)  2060-AB33 EPA  52FR47826  12/16/1987
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Regulation of fuels and fuel additives, gasoline lead 
content -- lead phasedown  2060-AB50 EPA 50FR9386 3/7/1985 
NOx emissions standards for light duty trucks and 
heavy duty engines and particulate emissions for 
heavy duty diesel engines  2060-AA52 EPA 50FR10606  3/15/1985 
EPCRA section 313: proposed addition of 
chemicals 2070-AC47 EPA  59FR61432  11/30/1994
National oil and hazardous substances pollution 
contingency plan  2050-AA75 EPA 55FR8666 3/8/1990 
EPCRA section 313: toxic chemical release 
inventory reporting, community right to know  2070-AB71 EPA  53FR4500  2/16/1988 
EPCRA section 311 and 312: emergency and 
hazardous chemical inventory forms and 
community right to know reporting requirements  2050-AB88 EPA  52FR38344  10/15/1987
National oil and hazardous substances contingency 
plan   EPA    
Water quality guidance for the Great Lakes system  2040-AC08 EPA  60FR  3/23/1995 
Oil pollution prevention: non-transportation-related 
onshore facilities  2050-AD30 EPA 59FR 7/1/1994 
Oil and gas extraction point source category, 
offshore subcategory, effluent limitations guidelines 
and new source performance standards (final rule)  2040-AA12 EPA 58FR41 3/4/1993 
Coastal nonpoint pollution control program 
development and approval guidance (EPA and 
NOAA), guidance specifying management 
measures for sources or nonpoint    EPA  58FR5182  1/19/1993 
Sewage sludge use and disposal regulations   2040-AA74 EPA  58FR  2/19/1993 
Organic chemicals, plastics and synthetic fibers 
point source category effluent limitations guidelines 
and standards  2040-AA05 EPA  52FR42522  11/5/1987 
Electroplating and metal finishing point source 
categories effluent limitations guidelines, 
pretreatment sources, and NSPS  2040-AA04 EPA  48FR32462  7/15/1983 
Iron and steel manufacturing point source category-
effluent limitations guidelines   EPA    
Worker protection standard for agricultural 
pesticides 2070-AA49 EPA  57FR38102  8/21/1992 
Data requirements for registration (alternative 2 - 
chosen option)  2070-AA07 EPA    
Land disposal restrictions phase II, universal 
treatment standards and treatment standards for 
organic toxicity, characteristic wastes, and newly 
listed wastes  2050-AD89 EPA  59FR47982  9/19/1994 
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Solid waste disposal facility criteria  2050-AB21 EPA  56FR50978  10/9/1991 
Hazardous waste management system-wood 
preservatives (option D was selected as the final 
rule)  2050-AC43 EPA 55FR50450  12/6/1990 
Land disposal restrictions for third scheduled waste 2050-AC73 EPA  55FR22520  6/1/1990 
Toxicity characteristic  2050-AA78 EPA  55FR11798  3/29/1990 
Hazardous waste management system-reportable 





Prohibit the land disposal of the first third of 
scheduled wastes ("second sixth" proposal) – 
alternative A  2050-AC13 EPA 53FR11742 1/6/1988 
Underground storage tanks: technical requirements  2050-AB19 EPA  53FR37082  9/23/1988 
RCRA financial responsibility requirements for 
Underground Storage Tanks  2050-AB89 EPA 53FR43322  10/26/1988
Hazardous waste management system: land 
disposal restrictions - California list  2050-AB65 EPA  52FR25760  7/8/1987 
Hazardous waste management system: final 
solvents and dioxins land disposal restrictions rule  2050-AA30 EPA 51FR40572  11/7/1986 
Drinking water regulations, synthetic organic 
chemicals-phase V  2040-AB11 EPA  57FR31776  7/17/1992 
Drinking water: lead and copper  2040-AB51 EPA  56FR26460  6/7/1991 
National primary and secondary water regulations-





National primary drinking water regulations: final 
surface water treatment rule  2040-AB24 EPA 54FR22062  6/29/1989 
National primary drinking water regulations: total 
coliform   EPA  54FR27544  6/29/1989 
Asbestos; manufacture, importation, processing, 
and distribution in commerce prohibitions   2070-AB29 EPA 54FR29460  7/12/1989 
Asbestos-containing materials in school rule  2070-AB44 EPA  51FR28914  8/12/1986 
PCB manufacture, processing, distribution in 
commerce and use prohibitions use in electrical 
transformers  2070-AA70 EPA    
Premanufacture notification and review procedures 2070-AA27 EPA  48FR21722  5/13/1983 
Seafood HAACP  0910-AA10 HHS  60FR65095  12/18/1995
Food labeling regulations  0905-AD08 HHS  58FR2927  1/6/1993 
Clinical laboratory improvement amendments of 
1988 (CLIA)  0938-AE47 HHS 57FR7002  2/28/1992 
Manufactured home construction and safety 
standards on wind standards  2502-AF91  HUD  59FR2456  1/14/1994 
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Animal welfare regulations (part 3) - specifications 
for the humane handling, care, treatment, and 
transportation of dogs, cats, and non-human 
primates  0579-AA20 USDA 55FR6426  2/15/91 
Animal welfare regulations (parts 1 & 2) – 
definitions of terms and regulations  0579-AA18 USDA  54FR36112  8/31/89 
Nutrition labeling of meat and poultry products  0583-AB34 USDA  58FR632  1/6/93 
 
Notes: CPSC = Consumer Product Safety Commission; DOL = Department of Labor; DOT = Department 
of Transportation; EPA = Environmental Protection Agency; HHS = Department of Health and Human 
Services; HUD = Department of Housing and Urban Development; USDA = Department of Agriculture. 
RIN indicates Regulation Identifier Number. FR Cite indicates the volume and page number of the Federal 
Register notice for the final rule. FR Date indicates the date on which the final rule was published in the 
Federal Register. Some older regulations do not have identifier numbers or accessible Federal Register 
notices. A blank indicates that such information was not available.   
 
                                                                 